May 2, 2000-1
Copyright © 2001 Earth Policy Institute
Falling Water Tables In China
May Soon Raise Food Prices Everywhere
Lester R. Brown
In 1999 the water table under Beijing fell by
2.5 meters (8 feet). Since 1965, the water table under the city
has fallen by some 59 meters or nearly 200 feet, warning Chinas
leaders of the shortages that lie ahead as the countrys aquifers
are depleted.
Hydrologically, there are two Chinasthe humid south, which
includes the Yangtze River basin and everything south of it, and
the north, which includes all the country north of the Yangtze basin.
The south, with 700 million people, has one third of the nations
cropland and four fifths of its water. The north, with 550 million
people, has two thirds of the cropland and one fifth of the water.
The water per hectare of cropland in the north is one eighth that
of the south.
The northern part of the country is drying out as
the demand for water outstrips the supply. Water tables are falling.
Wells are going dry. Streams are drying up, and rivers and lakes
are disappearing. Under the North China Plain, a region that stretches
from just north of Shanghai to well north of Beijing and that produces
40 percent of Chinas grain, the water table is dropping by
an average of 1.5 meters per year.
Farmers in the north are faced with losses of irrigation
water both from aquifer depletion and from the diversion to cities
and industry. Between now and 2010, when Chinas population
is projected to grow by 126 million, the World Bank projects that
the nations urban water demand will increase from 50 billion
cubic meters to 80 billion, a growth of 60 percent. Industrial water
demand, meanwhile, is projected to increase from 127 billion cubic
meters to 206 billion, an expansion of 62 percent. In much of northern
China, this growing demand for water can be satisfied only by taking
irrigation water from agriculture.
What happens to irrigation water supplies directly
affects Chinas agricultural prospect. Whereas less than 15
percent of the U.S. grain harvest comes from irrigated land, in
China it is close to 70 percent.
In the competition for water between cities, industry,
and agriculture, the economics of water use do not favor agriculture.
In China, a thousand tons of water produces one ton of wheat, worth
perhaps $200. The same water used in industry will expand output
by $14,000 70 times as much. In a country that is desperately
seeking economic growth and, even more, the jobs it generates, the
gain in diverting water from agriculture to industry is obvious.
The Yellow River, the northernmost of the countrys
two major rivers, is being overused. After flowing uninterrupted
for thousands of years, this cradle of Chinese civilization ran
dry in 1972, failing to reach the sea for some 15 days. In the following
years, it ran dry intermittently until 1985. Since then, it has
run dry for part of each year. In 1997, a drought year, the Yellow
River failed to reach the sea for 226 days.
In fact, during much of 1997 the river failed to
reach Shandong Province, the last of the eight it flows through
en route to the sea. Shandong, producing a fifth of Chinas
corn and a seventh of its wheat, is more important to China than
are Iowa and Kansas together to the United States. Half of the provinces
irrigation water used to come from the Yellow River, but this supply
is now shrinking. The other half comes from an aquifer that is falling
by 1.5 meters per year.
As more and more water is diverted to industry
and cities upstream, less is available downstream. Beijing is permitting
the poverty-ridden upstream provinces to divert water for their
development at the expense of agriculture in the lower reaches of
the basin.
Among the hundreds of projects to divert water
from the Yellow River in the upper reaches is a canal that will
take water to Hohhot, the capital of Inner Mongolia, starting in
2003. This additional water will help satisfy swelling residential
needs as well as those of expanding industries, including the all-important
wool textile industry that is supplied by the regions vast
flocks of sheep. Another canal will divert water to Taiyuan, the
capital city of Shanxi province, a city of some 4 million that has
recently been forced to ration water.
The growing upstream claims on the Yellow River
mean that one day it may no longer reach Shandong Province at all,
depriving the province of roughly half of its irrigation water.
The resulting prospect of massive grain imports and growing dependence
on U.S. grain leads to sleepless nights for political leaders in
Beijing.
Immediately to the north of the Yellow River basin
is the Hai River basin, which has over 100 million people and includes
Beijing and Tianjin, both large industrial cities. Water use in
the basin currently totals 55 billion cubic meters annually, while
the sustainable supply totals only 34 billion cubic meters. This
annual deficit of 21 billion cubic meters is being satisfied largely
by groundwater mining-by overpumping. Once the aquifer is depleted,
water pumping will necessarily drop to the sustainable yield, cutting
the water supply by nearly 40 percent. Given rapid urban and industrial
growth in the area, irrigated agriculture in the basin could largely
disappear by 2010, forcing a shift back to less productive rainfed
agriculture.
Meanwhile, as Chinas economy expands at a
projected annual rate of 7 percent, as it adds 12 million people
a year, and as Chinese eat more grain-fed meat, the countrys
need for grain will continue to grow. This, coming at a time when
grain production will be falling in key producing regions as water
shortages intensify, could quickly make China the worlds leading
grain importer, overtaking even Japan.
Water shortages can be ameliorated by using water
more efficiently, but in China this is not always easy. A recent
government strategy paper indicates that this means raising water
prices to an "appropriate" level, one much closer to market
value. For Beijing, this option is fraught with political risks
because the public response to raising water prices in China is
akin to that of raising gasoline prices in the United States.
Recent policy decisions indicate the direction
in which China is planning to move. For one, China has officially
abandoned its longstanding policy of grain self-sufficiency. After
raising the grain support price some 42 percent in 1994 in a valiant
effort to remain self-sufficient, the leaders in Beijing have since
acknowledged that the fiscal cost was too high, and they are permitting
the price of grain to fall toward world market levels. They have
also announced that in the competition for water, cities and industry
get priority-leaving agriculture last.
China is not alone in facing water shortages. Other
countries where water scarcity is raising grain imports or threatening
to do so include India, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Mexico, and dozens
of smaller countries. But only Chinawith nearly 1.3 billion
people, a fast-growing economy, and a $40-billion-plus trade surplus
with the United Stateshas the potential to disrupt world grain
markets. In short, falling water tables in China could soon mean
rising food prices for the entire world.
Copyright
© 2000 Earth Policy Institute
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FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
From Worldwatch Institute
Lester R. Brown, Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up
Call for a Small Planet (W.W. Norton & Co., NY: 1995).
Lester R. Brown and Brian Halweil, Chinas Water Shortages
Could Shake World Food Security, World Watch, July/August
1998.
Sandra Postel, Pillar of Sand: Can the Irrigation Miracle Last?
(W.W. Norton & Co., NY: 1999).
From Other Sources
Frederick Crook, Water Pressure in China:
Growth Strains Resources, Agricultural Outlook, ERS,
USDA, January-February 2000.
Albert Nyberg and Scott Rozelle, Accelerating Chinas Rural
Transformation (The World Bank, Washington, DC: 1999).
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